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Never Mind the Bollocks
Here’s the Drake Music Project:
A Capability Perspective of Dis/ability
and Musical Identities
Michael Watts & Barbara Ridley
Taboo, Fall-Winter 2006
Introduction
	 As	part	of	our	evaluation	of	the	Drake	Music	Project	(Watts	et al.,	2005;	Watts	&	
Ridley,	forthcoming)	we	attended	a	concert	in	which	a	number	of	cover	and	original	
pieces	were	played	to	what	we	considered	a	very	high	standard.	Indeed,	all	in	all,	
the	evening	was	very	enjoyable.	Yet	we	were	confronted	with	a	problem:	How	to	
provide	a	theoretical	framework	for	the	evaluation	that	would	enable	us	to	focus	
on	the	identities	generated	by	the	music	that	was	made.	To	put	this	problem	into	
context,	imagine	two	of	these	musicians	who	we	shall	(in	pursuit	of	their	anonym-
ity)	call	Thelma	and	Louise.	Both	are	guitarists:	Thelma	plays	acoustic	guitar	and	
Louise	bass.	Both	are	competent	musicians,	although	Thelma	has	been	playing	for	
much	longer	than	Louise,	and	both	got	to	demonstrate	their	competence	with	a	few	
solos.	Both	are	also	wheelchair	users	and	registered	as	disabled.	However,	while	
Thelma	plays	a	normal	acoustic	guitar	Louise	uses	a	foot	pedal	linked	through	a	
computer	system	to	play	her	bass.	The	use	of	the	word	‘however’	in	the	preceding	
sentence	is	deliberate	and	the	essentialist	difference	it	predicates	was	central	to	our	
problem	of	using	a	framework	that	would	enable	us	to	focus	on	their	musicianship	
rather	than	their	disabilities.	
	 The	Drake	Music	Project	(www.drakemusicproject.org)	uses	electronic	and	
computer	technologies	to	enable	profoundly	disabled	people	to	explore,	compose	
and	perform	music.	To	meet	our	evaluation	brief	of	considering	how	effectively	
Drake	was	meeting	this	remit,	we	focused	on	the	musicians’	sense	of	identity.	Al-
though	they	acknowledged	both	biological	and	social	aspects	of	their	disabilities,	
the	musicians	themselves	were	concerned	to	emphasise	their	musicianship	over	
their	disabilities	 in	 their	own	construction	of	 their	 identities.	 In	particular,	 they	
stressed	that	they	considered	themselves	to	be	engaged	with	participatory	music	
making	rather	than	therapeutic	music	practices.	As	one	of	them	explained:
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Being	with	the	Drake	Music	Project	is	a	chance	to	be	a	musician	and	not	someone	
with	a	disability.	Because	we	don’t	do	music	 therapy…	If	people	 think	we	do	
music	therapy,	that’s	what	people	with	disabilities	do.	But	here,	with	the	music,	
we’re	musicians.	It’s	just	that	we’re	musicians	in	wheelchairs.	But	we’re	musi-
cians	here.	The	music	gets	us	away	from	being	disabled.	It’s	like	it	gets	us	away	
from	the	wheelchairs.	But	if	you	think	it’s	music	therapy,	then	that’s	like	it	puts	
us	back	in	the	wheelchairs.
	 As	this	comment	makes	clear,	they	wanted	to	be	seen	as	musicians	and	they	
wanted	to	be	judged	by	their	musicianship.	However	(and	perhaps	this	should	not	
be	too	surprising)	prevailing	theories	of	disability	draw	attention	to	the	individual’s	
disability	and	therefore	risk	drawing	attention	away	from	the	music.	To	address	this,	
we	needed	an	evaluative	framework	that	would	enable	us	to	focus	on	their	musi-
cianship	without	either	overstating	or	ignoring	the	influence	of	their	disabilities.	
	 To	do	this	we	turned	to	the	capability	approach	of	Economics	Nobel	Laureate	
Amartya	Sen	(inter alia	1987,	1992,	1999).	In	this	paper	we	consider	the	benefits	
of	using	the	capability	approach	to	address	the	issue	of	disability,	music	making	
and	identity.	We	begin	by	addressing	the	role	of	music	in	identity	formation	and	
summarising	the	complex	interplay	between	dis/ability,	music	and	identity.	We	then	
introduce	the	capability	approach	and	outline	the	findings	of	our	capability-based	
evaluation	of	the	Drake	Music	Project.	The	paper	concludes	with	a	reflection	on	
the	ontological	benefits	of	using	the	capability	approach	in	disability	studies.
Music and Identity
	 From	 ring-tones	 on	 mobile	 phones	 to	Wagner’s	 Ring	 Cycle	 at	 the	 Opera	
House,	in	one	form	or	another,	music—rather	like	love	in	the	old	Troggs’	song	
(Presley,	1967)—is	all	around	us	and,	whether	or	not	we	whistle	along	with	Walt	
Disney’s	Seven	Dwarves	while	we	work,	we	could	so	far	as	to	assume	that	music	
is	universal.	Indeed,	in	her	defence	of	universal	human	values	(2000,	pp.	34-110)	
the	American	philosopher	Martha	Nussbaum	includes	music	in	her	list	of	central	
human	functionings	(that	is,	those	activities	we	value	and	should	have	the	freedom	
to	pursue,	if	we	so	wish)	that	make	up	the	‘good	life’:
Senses, Imagination, and Thought.	Being	able	to	use	the	senses,	to	imagine,	
think,	and	reason—and	to	do	these	things	in	a	“truly	human”	way,	a	way	informed	
and	cultivated	by	an	adequate	education…	Being	able	 to	use	 imagination	and	
thought	 in	 connection	with	 experiencing	 and	producing	 self-expressive	works	
and	events	of	one’s	own	choice,	religious,	literary,	musical,	and	so	forth…	Being	
able	to	use	one’s	mind	in	ways	protected	by	guarantees	of	freedom	of	expression	
with	respect	to	both	political	and	artistic	speech…	(Nussbaum,	2000,	pp.	78-79,	
italicised	emphasis	added)
	 This	is	not	cultivation	in	the	sense	of	high	culture	but	of	education	and	learning	
or,	in	Nussbaum’s	terms,	flourishing;	and	it	serves	as	a	reminder	that	we	are	taught	
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who	we	are	and	what	we	value.	That	is,	we	learn	to	construct	our	own	identities	
and	shape	our	own	images	of	ourselves.	The	music	that	we	listen	to	and	make	can	
play	a	significant	role	in	these	processes.	Drawing	on	Paul	Willis’	Profane Culture	
(1978)	DeNora	explains	how	musical	tastes	can	be	seen	as	analogous	to	valued	
ways	of	being,	as	a	means	of	representing	how	we	want	to	be	identified	(2000).	For	
example,	singing	the	(British)	National	Anthem	is	an	expression	of	one	particular	
identity	while	joining	in	with,	say,	the	Sex	Pistols’	own	version	of	God Save the 
Queen	(Lydon	et al.,	1977)	is	an	expression	of	a	very	different	identity	(and	one	
that	we	allude	to	in	the	title	of	our	paper).	However,	this	does	not	necessarily	require	
choosing	one	identity	over	the	other	as	we	typically	make	use	of	multiple	identities,	
drawing	on	different	identities	for	different	occasions,	and	it	would	not	be	unusual	
to	find	someone	capable	of	singing	both	songs	with	conviction	at	different	times	
and	in	different	places.	Similarly,	 the	musicians	working	with	the	Drake	Music	
Project	 have	multiple	 identities	 including	 those	 identities	 associated	with	 their	
musicianship	and	their	disabilities	(amongst	many	other	identities).
	 In	the	complex	social	world	we	inhabit,	one	in	which	once-rigid	social	distinc-
tions	continue	to	break	down,	we	have	a	greater	responsibility	for	leading	the	lives	
we	want	to	lead	and	selecting	the	appropriate	identities	to	match	(Giddens,	1994;	
Hall	&	du	Gay,	1996;	Furlong	&	Cartmel,	1997).	Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	
this	has	become	something	of	an	inevitability	and	that	we	have	‘no	choice	but	to	
choose	how	to	be	and	how	to	act’	(Giddens,	1994,	p.	75).	However,	this	should	not	
be	interpreted	as	the	freedom	to	choose	how	to	be	and	how	to	act	because	these	
‘choices’	are	‘very	often	bounded	by	factors	out	of	the	hands	of	the	individual	or	
individuals	 they	affect’	 (ibid.)	and	 the	 identities	we	choose—or,	 rather,	 seek	 to	
choose—may	well	be	overwritten	by	factors	such	as	class,	gender,	ethnicity	and	
dis/ability.	Moreover,	 there	 is	a	complex	and	dynamic	relationship	between	 the	
identities	we	try	to	present	of	ourselves	and	those	that	others	seek	to	pin	on	us	and,	
like	so	many	other	aspects	of	society,	the	power	to	manipulate	these	identities	is	
not	equally	distributed.	Those	members	of	society	with	less	social	power,	those	on	
the	margins	of	society,	have	fewer	opportunities	to	present	their	chosen	identities	
and	are	more	susceptible	to	the	identities	ascribed	to	them	by	others.	
	 The	music	we	identify	ourselves	with,	as	well	as	the	music	other	people	identify	
us	with,	can	play	its	part	in	the	maintenance	of	these	social	structures.	The	French	
sociologist	Pierre	Bourdieu	has	written	at	length	on	the	ways	in	which	musical	tastes	
and	musical	identities	act	as	a	medium	for	the	construction	of	social	differences	
(1984).	Bourdieu’s	argument	was	that	culture	is	a	medium	of	interaction	or	a	form	
of	‘capital’	that	can,	like	economic	capital,	be	used	as	a	measure	of	status	within	
social	hierarchies.	People,	in	other	words,	can	and	do	use	culture	as	a	site	and	as	a	
means	of	social	competition;	and,	within	this	sociology	of	cultural	consumption,	
the	Wagnerian	operas	that	make	up	the	Ring	Cycle	are	typically	seen	as	having	
high	cultural	capital	whereas	reduced	to	a	ring-tone	on	a	mobile	phone	the	music	
would	have	low	cultural	capital.
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	 There	is,	then,	a	dynamic	(and	typically	unjust)	relationship	between	music	
and	identity:	whilst	the	music	we	identify	with	may,	to	some	extent,	help	determine	
our	identities,	these	same	identities	may	also	determine	both	the	amount	of	cultural	
capital	invested	in	any	music	and	its	location	in	the	hierarchy	of	legitimacy.	At	the	
same	time,	identity	(which	may	well	be	expressed	through	music)	is	not	simply	
about	who	and	what	we	are	but	who	and	what	we	are	not.	Given	the	extent	of	public	
uneasiness	and	even	fear	about	disability,	and	given	that	we	have	multiple	identities,	
other	people	may	choose	to	focus	on	one	identity	(such	as	the	identity	of	disability)	
rather	than	the	individual’s	preferred	identity	(here,	that	of	the	musician)	as	a	means	
of	reasserting	their	own	able-bodied	identity.	This	means	that	the	disability	may	
become	salient	and	the	musicianship	either	ignored	or	overlooked.	
	 One	of	 the	challenges	 facing	musicians	with	disability	 is	 to	break	 through	
the	social	constructions	that	can	leave	people	seeing	only	the	disability	and	not	
the	musicianship.	Thus,	the	issue	we	found	ourselves	addressing	was	‘not	how	a	
particular	piece	of	music	or	a	performance	reflects	the	people,	but	how	it	produces	
them’	(Frith,	1996,	p.	109).	
Dis/Ability and Music
	 The	distinction	that	the	Drake	Music	Project	makes	between	participatory	and	
therapeutic	music	is,	therefore,	extremely	significant	because	of	the	associations	these	
two	approaches	have	and	because	music	can	be	used	as	a	means	of	denigrating	and	
repressing	others	(Willis,	1978;	Bourdieu,	1984;	Cloonan	&	Johnson,	2002).	Most	
of	the	literature	on	music	and	disability	is	concerned	with	music	therapy.	There	is	
much	that	music	therapy	can	achieve:	it	has	been	shown	to	decrease	anxiety	levels	
of	children	with	physical	disabilities,	assist	in	physical	and	mental	rehabilitation	
and	encourage	peer	interaction	in	adults	with	learning	disabilities	(inter alia	Thaut,	
1992;	Paul	&	Ramsey,	2000;	Hooper,	2002).	Moreover,	we	found	that	participation	
in	the	Drake	Music	Project	had	therapeutic	benefits	for	the	musicians	(Watts	et al.,	
2004,	pp.	47-48).	
	 However,	music	therapy	typically	operates	within	an	essentialist	(or	individualist,	
biological,	medical,	clinical	or	deficit)	model	of	disability	which	conceptualises	it	
as	an	abnormality	that	is	clearly	distinct	from	an	assumed	state	of	human	normality	
(Baylies,	2002;	Burchardt,	2004;	Terzi,	2005a	&	b;	Watts	&	Ridley,	forthcoming).	
Music	therapists	tend	to	‘observe	the	client’s	use	of	music,	and	how	problems	or	
difficulties	may	get	in	the	way	of	interactive	communication’	(Duffy	&	Fuller,	2000,	
p.	78)	and	the	common	assumption	that	disability	is	‘some	kind	of	sickness	to	be	
healed	as	opposed	to	a	condition	that	can	limit	access	to	the	usual	opportunities	
of	life’	(Everitt,	1997,	p.	128)	carries	considerable	implications	for	how	disabled	
musicians	are	seen	because	musical	therapy	is	characteristically	seen	as	mimetic	and	
often	doomed	to	failure	rather	than	as	a	means	of	celebrating	individual	expression.	
It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	many	people	‘still	have	an	image	of	people	with	
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disability	not	having	anything	to	say’	(Prendergast,	1996,	p.	88)	and	that	music	
performed	by	disabled	musicians	is	still	often	seen	as	‘a	second-class	activity	for	
those	who	must	be,	by	implication,	second-class	citizens’	(Everitt,	1997,	p.	20).	
	 This	highlights	the	significance	of	the	Drake	Music	Project’s	focus	on	par-
ticipatory	music	and	the	musicians’	composition,	exploration	and	playing	of	that	
music.	To	consider	it	as	mere	therapy	is	to	establish	a	deficit	framework	that	as-
sumes	deviation	from	an	assumed	notion	of	human	normality	and	focuses	on	their	
disability	 and	 this	 prejudices	 the	 identities	 of	 the	musicians	 and	 the	 aesthetics	
of	 their	music.	Moreover,	and	pragmatically,	 it	creates	significant	methodologi-
cal	difficulties	that	we	have	indicated	with	the	examples	of	Thelma	and	Louise:	
although	both	are	wheelchair	users	and	registered	as	disabled,	and	both	therefore	
deviate	from	biological	constructions	of	normality,	Thelma’s	use	of	a	conventional	
acoustic	guitar	sits	uneasily	within	a	deficit	model	of	disability	alongside	Louise’s	
need	for	specialised	equipment	to	play	bass.	We	sought	to	resolve	this	issue	in	our	
evaluation	by	turning	to	the	capability	approach	of	Amartya	Sen	because	this	al-
lowed	us	to	address	the	musicians’	disabilities	(which	prevented	most	of	them	from	
using	conventional	instruments)	as	well	as	the	opportunities	they	had	to	identify	
themselves,	and	to	be	recognised	as,	musicians.	
A Capability Perspective of Disability
	 The	 capability	 approach	 was	 developed	 by	 the	 Nobel	 Economics	 Laureate	
Amartya	Sen	(inter alia	1987,	1992	&	1999)	and	is	concerned	with	the	substantive	
freedoms	people	have	to	pursue	lives	and	ways	of	living	that	they	value	and	have	
reason	to	value.	Although	commonly	associated	with	evaluations	of	poverty	reduc-
tion	programmes	in	the	developing	world	it	was	not	intended	to	be	geographically	
restricted	and	it	has	proved	to	be	a	very	effective	means	of	addressing	issues	of	social	
in/justice.	The	main	argument	of	the	capability	approach	is	that	human	development	
should	aim	to	 increase	 individual	well-being	by	enabling	access	 to	 the	 resources	
people	need	in	order	to	choose	and	achieve	what	is	important	to	them	and	it	is	in	
this	acknowledgement	of	human	diversity	and	its	influence	on	individual	well-being	
that	the	capability	approach	can	make	a	significant	contribution	to	disability	studies	
(Baylies,	2002;	Burchardt,	2004;	Terzi,	2005a	&	b;	Watts	&	Ridley,	forthcoming).
	 Sen	argues	that	utilitarian	measurements	of	income,	possessions	and	resources	
cannot	provide	a	proper	assessment	of	a	person’s	well-being	because	possessions	
are	not	good	in	themselves	but	only	for	what	they	can	do	for	people	and	people	are	
not	possessed	of	equal	abilities	to	make	equal	use	of	the	same	possessions.	Both	
points	can	be	illustrated	by	the	frequently	used	example	of	a	bicycle	(inter alia	Sen	
1985,	p.	10)	as	something	that	provides	no	benefit	to	its	owner	if	she	cannot	ride	it	
because	she	is	disabled	or	has	never	learned	how	to	ride	it.	Similarly,	a	conventional	
musical	instrument,	such	as	an	acoustic	guitar,	is	of	no	value	to	someone	like	Louise	
whose	cerebral	palsy	means	she	cannot	play	it.	No	matter	how	many	guitars	she	
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has	at	what	cost,	her	well-being	is	not	increased	in	any	meaningful	sense	by	pos-
sessing	them.	The	capability	approach	recognises	that	there	is	more	to	well-being	
than	being	well	off	and	that	a	person’s	standard	of	living	‘must	be	directly	a	matter	
of	the	life	one	leads	rather	than	of	the	resources	and	means	one	has	to	lead	a	life’	
(Sen	1987,	p.	16).	
	 This	concern	with	the	freedom	to	choose	from	‘the	range	of	options	a	person	
has	in	deciding	what	kind	of	life	to	lead’	(Drèze	and	Sen	1995,	p.	11)	provides	
a	 fuller	 account	 of	 an	 individual’s	well-being	 but	 it	 also	 poses	methodological	
and	analytical	problems.	To	enable	this	focus	on	freedom,	Sen	makes	use	of	the	
concepts	of	functionings	and	capabilities.	A	‘functioning	is	an	achievement’	that	
‘reflects	the	various	things	a	person	may	value	doing	or	being’	whilst	‘a	capability	
is	the	ability	to	achieve’	and	‘is	thus	a	kind	of	freedom…	the	freedom	to	achieve	
various	lifestyles’	(Sen,	1987,	p.	36	&	1999,	p.	75).	A	person’s	functionings	and	
capabilities	 are	closely	 linked	but	 significantly	different:	 functionings	are	 ‘in	a	
sense,	more	directly	related	to	living	conditions,	since	they	are	different	aspects	of	
living	conditions’	whilst	capabilities	are	‘notions	of	freedom	in	the	positive	sense:	
what	real	opportunities	you	have	regarding	the	life	you	may	lead’	(Sen	1987,	p.	
36,	original	emphasis).	The	difference	between	functionings	and	capabilities,	then,	
is	the	difference	between	the	realised	and	the	potential,	between	outcome	and	op-
portunity,	and	between	achievement	and	the	freedom	to	achieve.
	 To	assess	well-being	we	must	consider	the	alternative	combinations	of	func-
tionings	from	which	a	person	can	choose	and	so	we	must	examine	‘the	extent	to	
which	people	have	the	opportunity	to	achieve	outcomes	that	they	value	and	have	
reason	to	value’	(Sen	1999,	p.	291,	emphasis	added).	These	options	form	a	person’s	
capability	set.	Capability—or	the	capability	to	function—represents	the	various	
combinations	of	functionings	that	a	person	can	achieve	and	choose	from.	It	reflects	
‘a	person’s	freedom	to	lead	one	type	of	life	or	another	[and	their]	freedom	to	choose	
from	possible	livings’	(Sen	1992,	p.	40).	A	person’s	well-being,	then,	is	to	be	found	
in	her	freedom	to	choose	from	different	possible	functionings,	different	beings	and	
doings,	different	ways	of	living	life.	
The Value of Musicianship
	 The	evaluation	concluded	that	 the	musicians’	substantive	freedom	to	make	
music	and	to	identify,	and	be	identified	as,	musicians	was	extremely	limited	but	
that	they	were	able	to	achieve	these	‘valued	doings	and	beings’	(or	functionings)	
through	 the	 Drake	Music	 Project	 with	 its	 specialised	 equipment	 and	 training.	
Musicianship	was	something	these	musicians	valued	and	had	reason	to	value.	It	
brought	them	pleasure	and	enabled	them	to	express	their	creativity.	Participation	
in	the	Drake	Music	Project	introduced	them	to	new	and	different	genres	of	music	
and	therefore	provided	them	with	new	learning	opportunities	that	enabled	them	
to	expand	their	own	musical	abilities	that	enhanced	the	satisfaction	obtained	from	
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creative	encounters	with	their	music.	It	also	provided	them	with	opportunities	for	
socialising	with	people	who	shared	common	interests.
	 Their	music	making	gave	them	the	opportunity	to	create	and	share	something	to	
be	judged	by	its	own	criteria	rather	than	with	reference	to	their	disabilities.	Moreover,	
in	composing	and	performing	their	own	music	they	were	engaging	with	something	
they	had	control	over,	something	that	enabled	them	to	move	beyond	the	restrictions	
of	their	disabilities.	Live	performances	in	particular,	with	no	special	allowance	made	
for	their	disabilities,	meant	that	they	were	just	as	likely	to	make	mistakes	as	able-
bodied	musicians	and	their	work	as	an	ensemble	meant	that	they	had	responsibility	
not	only	to	themselves	but	to	their	fellow	musicians	and	to	their	audiences.	Music	
making,	therefore,	was	a	means	of	putting	their	disabilities	into	their	proper	place	
and	of	challenging	normative	societal	views	of	musicians	with	disabilities.	This	gave	
them	good	reason	to	value	their	musicianship:	it	shaped	their	self	and	social	identi-
ties.	Participatory	music	making	had	the	potential	to	enable	them	to	transcend	the	
salience	of	their	disabilities	and	to	identify	as	musicians	who	are	able	to	both	make	
and	take	music	and	who	are	able	to	compose,	explore	and	to	perform	it.
	 The	importance	of	this	may	be	self-evident	but	there	was	a	deeper	significance	
that	was	made	clear	when	other	opportunities	to	achieve	these	valued	outcomes	
were	considered.	Socialisation	can	take	place	through	other	activities	that	disabled	
and	able-bodied	people	alike	can	engage	in.	Yet	they	did	not	offer	the	creativity	of	
musicianship.	Some	of	the	musicians	pursued	their	creativity	through	other	outlets	
such	as	painting	and	poetry.	However,	these	are	more	individualistic	pursuits	and,	
although	they	enabled	socialisation	with	other	artists	and	new	learning	opportunities,	
they	did	not	carry	the	responsibility	of	group	composition	and	performance.	Nor	
did	they	necessarily	allow	for	public	demonstrations	of	ability.	Sporting	activities	
offer	the	thrill	of	live	performance	that	was	so	important	to	these	musicians	but	
it	is	not	something	that	everyone	can,	or	wants	to,	take	part	in.	It	also	tends	to	be	
segregated	into	activities	and	competition	for	the	disabled	so	that	although	achieve-
ment	may	be	celebrated	it	also	reifies	disabilities.	
	 The	deeper	significance	of	their	musicianship,	then,	is	that	there	were	few,	if	
any,	other	opportunities	for	many	of	these	musicians	to	achieve	the	valued	outcomes	
generated	by	their	musicianship	and	this	gave	them	greater	reason	to	value	their	
involvement	with	the	Drake	Music	Project.	
Conclusion 
As	the	same	evaluative	conclusions	could	be	drawn	from	other	forms	of	qualita-
tive	evaluation,	we	need	to	pause	to	consider	why	it	was	important	to	make	use	of	
the	capability	approach.	The	informational	space	of	the	evaluation	did	not	focus	
on	the	musicians’	disabilities	or	the	specialised	musical	equipment	that	signalled	
those	disabilities.	That	is,	the	evaluation	did	not	take	place	within	an	essentialist	
framework	that	assumed	a	model	of	human	normality	from	which	these	musicians	
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deviated	because	of	their	disabilities.	It	assumed,	instead,	the	complexity	of	human	
diversity.	We	indicated	this	complexity	at	the	outset	with	reference	to	Thelma	and	
Louise	who,	despite	both	being	disabled,	had	significantly	different	opportunities	
to	make	music	using	conventional	instruments.	
	 The	physical	manifestations	of	disability,	as	well	as	social	attitudes	and	political	
responses	towards	it,	may	influence	the	individual’s	freedom	to	pursue	a	life	that	
she	values	and	has	reason	to	value;	and	in	using	the	capability	approach	to	assess	
provision	for	those	with	disabilities	we	cannot	overlook	these	potential	restrictions	
on	freedom.	However,	in	recognising	the	inevitable	diversity	of	human	life,	which	
necessarily	includes	disability,	the	capability	approach	rejects	any	normative	concep-
tion	of	humanity	against	which	disability	is	measured.	Other	models	of	disability,	
particularly	essentialist	models,	assume	levels	of	deficit.	The	musicians’	disabilities	
cannot	and	should	not	be	overlooked	but	they	need	not	define	them.	The	capability	
approach,	we	suggest,	is	able	to	negotiate	these	issues	by	focusing	on	the	‘extent	to	
which	people	have	the	opportunity	to	achieve	outcomes	that	they	value	and	have	
reason	to	value’	(Sen	1999,	p.	291).	
	 The	capability	approach	required	us	to	consider	the	musicians’	functionings—
that	is,	those	‘doings	and	beings’	they	valued	and	had	reason	to	value—rather	than	
focus	on	their	disabilities	or	on	the	specialised	musical	equipment	and	training	that	
signalled	those	disabilities.	Only	then	did	we	address	the	physical	and	environmental	
factors	that	enabled	or	inhibited	them	to	achieve	these	functionings.	The	signifi-
cance	of	this	is	that	it	required	us	to	consider	the	musicians	first	and	foremost	as	
musicians	rather	than	as	people	with	disabilities.	That	is,	the	capability	approach	
gave	us	the	ontological	freedom	to	consider	them	as	members	of	the	extremely	
diverse	human	race	rather	than	as	being	biologically	deficient.	And	this	gave	us	
the	evaluative	freedom	to	focus	on	their	musicianship	without	undermining	their	
identity	as	musicians	or	the	aesthetics	of	their	music.	
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